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On 25 June 2019, the Department of Defense (DoD) Space Test Program (STP) launched the STP-2 mission from 
Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Complex 39A on a SpaceX Falcon Heavy. This groundbreaking mission carried 
twenty-four space vehicles to three different orbits and achieved many firsts. As might be expected in such a 
complex rideshare mission, there were many lessons learned.   This paper discusses some of those lessons learned, 
particularly related to managing and working with multiple organizations, performing interface control, sorting 
through policy and compliance, and conducting mission assurance, fit checks, and launch integration.  
STP has a 50+ year history of providing access to space for research and development satellites, most of them small 
satellites. The STP-2 launch represents the latest in a long line of multi-manifest rideshare missions. Our hope is to 
enlighten similar mission teams attempting large rideshare efforts across the entire space system development and 
launch community.  
MISSION DESCRIPTION 
On June 25, 2019, a combined Department of Defense 
(DoD) Space Test Program (STP) and SpaceX team 
successfully launched the STP-2 mission from the 
historic Kennedy Space Center's Launch Complex 39A 
(LC-39A) in Florida.  The STP-2 mission marked the 
third launch of SpaceX’s newest and most powerful 
launch vehicle - the Falcon Heavy - and the first Falcon 
Heavy launch for DoD.  It also demonstrated the first-
ever re-use of launch vehicle first-stage boosters and 
was the first multi-payload, multi-orbit mission for the 
Falcon Heavy.  The STP-2 mission had a complex 
integrated payload stack (IPS) of 24 space vehicles 
from 13 launch partner organizations separating in three 
different orbits. 
Goals/Objectives 
Since the STP-2 mission consisted of so many launch 
partners, there were many objectives at many different 
levels. The space vehicle providers, experiment payload 
providers, STP, the Air Force Space and Missile 
Systems Center (SMC), and SpaceX all had their own 
objectives.  Combining all the participants into a 
mission where each had an opportunity to succeed was 
the role of the STP and SpaceX. 
For SpaceX, demonstration of the Falcon Heavy 
capabilities was a primary purpose. National Security 
Space Launch New Entrant Certification, reusability of 
Figure 1: STP-2 Integrated Payload Stack 
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flight hardware, delivery of spacecraft to three different 
orbits, and additional flight data for future launches 
were all objectives. SMC had similar objectives to 
SpaceX. STP desired successful launch of the six 
COSMIC-2 spacecraft, the single DSX spacecraft, the 
five ESPA-class spacecraft, and 24U of CubeSats 
without spacecraft harming each other or the launch, so 
each spacecraft would have the opportunity to 
demonstrate technology, provide desired data, and 
advance relevant knowledge.  In addition, fourteen of 
the experiments on board were selected through the 
DoD Space Experiments Review Board (SERB); access 
to space for SERB experiments is STP’s primary 
mission.  COSMIC-2 and DSX were designated the co-
primes of the STP-2 mission by virtue of their driving 
orbit requirements, with secondary priority given to the 
ESPA-class spacecraft, and tertiary priority given to the 
CubeSats.   
SMC and SpaceX also leveraged the STP-2 mission to 
gain insight into the SpaceX process for recovering and 
refurbishing first-stage boosters on the Falcon family of 
launch vehicles for DoD use. Such insight will lead the 
way for future technical and management teams to 
balance the risks and benefits of using previously flown 
rockets to meet warfighting requirements.   
 
 
Spacecraft Descriptions and Organizations 
The 24 spacecraft on the STP-2 mission consisted of 
the following satellites, which are also listed in Figures 
2 and 3.  
DSX (Demonstration and Science Experiments), from 
Air Force Research Laboratory, benefits future military 
and civil space assets by performing the basic research 
to understand space weather phenomena, improve the 
operation of space systems in the space weather 
environment, and experiment with advanced techniques 
that could alter these phenomena and reduce space 
weather degradation of critical space assets. 
COSMIC-2 (Constellation Observing System for 
Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate-2), from the 
Taiwanese National Space Organization (NSPO), 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), and SMC is a six-satellite constellation 
providing next-generation global navigational satellite 
system radio occultation data. Radio occultation data is 
collected by measuring the changes in a radio signal as 
it is refracted in the atmosphere, allowing temperature 
and moisture to be determined. This data will lead to 
better weather forecasting and trending for climate 
change applications. 
GPIM (Green Propellant Infusion Mission) is a NASA 
mission that develops a "green" alternative to 
Figure 2: Co-prime and auxiliary payloads on STP-2 
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conventional spacecraft propulsion systems. With the 
green propellant, spacecraft fuel loading will be safer, 
faster and much less costly.  The GPIM spacecraft also 
carries three other experiments from the SERB. 
NPSat-1 (Naval Postgraduate School Satellite-1) hosts 
two experiments built by the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) to investigate space weather and 
support space situational awareness, including the 
measurement of ionospheric electron density structures 
that cause radio scintillations. 
Prox-1 (Proximity Ops-1) is a microsatellite developed 
by students at the Georgia Institute of Technology in 
Atlanta through the AFRL’s University Nanosat 
Program. Its goal was to demonstrate satellite close 
proximity operations and rendezvous. 
Oculus-ASR (Oculus-Attitude and Shape Recognition) 
was developed by students at the Michigan 
Technological University in Houghton, MI through the 
AFRL’s University Nanosatellite Program. Its goal is to 
provide calibration opportunities for ground-based 
observers attempting to determine spacecraft attitude 
and configuration using unresolved optical imagery.  
OTB (Orbital Test Bed) is a versatile, modular platform 
based on a flight-proven “hosting” model, built by 
General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems to test and 
qualify technologies. On STP-2, OTB hosts several 
payloads for technology demonstration, including a 
Deep Space Atomic Clock designed and built by 
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory on behalf of the 
Space Technology Mission Directorate for deep space 
navigation and exploration, as well as two other 
experiments from the SERB. 
E-TBEx (Extended Tandem Beacon Experiment) 
consists of two 3U CubeSats from University of 
Michigan and observes how radio signals are distorted 
by transit through the ionosphere using tones 
transmitted from eight separate orbital locations (two 
separate CubeSats and the six COSMIC-II satellites). 
Better understanding of this distortion can lead to 
improved communication techniques. 
TEPCE (Tether Electrodynamic Propulsion CubeSat 
Experiment), which consists of two 1.5U CubeSats 
from NRL, demonstrates electrodynamic propulsion in 
the space environment by using a conductive tether 
strung between the two CubeSats to generate energy. 
PSAT (Parkinson Satellite), a 1.5U CubeSat from the 
United States Naval Academy, supports global amateur 
radio data relay capabilities to assist students and 
researchers around the world. 
BRICSat-2 (Ballistically Reinforced Communication 
Satellite-2), a 1.5U CubeSat from the United States 
Naval Academy, is designed to be small, affordable, 
and an ideal platform for testing new space technology 
such as a micro-cathode thruster system. Specifically, 
on the STP-2 mission, a small, low power electric 
propulsion system is being tested. 
LEO (Launch Environment Observer) & StangSat, a 2U 
CubeSat from California Polytechnic State University 
and a 1U CubeSat from Merritt Island High School, 
sponsored by NASA. Together these vehicles measure 
Figure 3: CubeSats on STP-2 
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thermal and vibration environments during launch and 
transmit the information to the ground while 
demonstrating Wi-Fi data transmission between 
CubeSats during launch.  
Prometheus is a constellation of United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) CubeSats 
developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. The 
1.5U CubeSat is part a technology development and 
demonstration effort to explore the viability of using a 
CubeSat constellation to meet existing Special 
Operation Forces mission requirements. Specifically, 
these CubeSats are demonstrating the capability to 
transfer audio, video, and data files from man-portable, 
low-profile, remotely located field units to deployable 
ground terminals using over the horizon satellite 
communications. 
LightSail 2, a 3U CubeSat from the Planetary Society, 
demonstrates solar sailing as a method of propulsion for 
CubeSats. 
FalconSat-7, also known as DOTSI (Deployable 
Optical Telescope for Space Situational Awareness and 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) from 
the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) and 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is a 
mission to deploy a membrane photon sieve from a 3U 
CubeSat and image the Sun. This novel technique will 
allow for high-resolution space-based imagery from a 
small, low-cost telescope. 
ARMADILLO (Atmosphere Related Measurements 
and Detection of Submillimeter Objects) is a 3U 
CubeSat to characterize the submillimeter dust particle 
environment in low-Earth orbit using a 10 cm 
Piezoelectric Dust Detector screen located on the 
bottom face of the spacecraft. This knowledge will help 
future satellite designers build better satellites.  
Partnership Composition 
As a multi-manifest mission with 13 partners launching 
15 satellite programs consisting of 24 space vehicles 
separating in three different orbits, STP-2 was a 
complicated mission. The STP-2 payloads were 
assembled from a host of mission partners including the 
NOAA, NASA, DoD research laboratories (Air Force 
Research Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory), 
universities and academia (Michigan Technological 
University, University of Texas at Austin, University of 
Michigan, Georgia Institute of Technology, USAFA, 
Naval Post Graduate School, and Merritt Island High 
School), operational DoD entities (USSOCOM), and 
commercial industry (Planetary Society).  Strong 
working relationships were also developed with the 
international partners (National Space Organization of 
Taiwan and Surrey UK) for the COSMIC-2 spacecraft.    
The assorted satellite manifest was managed by the 
DoD Space Test Program (2018 Air Force Program 
Office of the Year / Secretary Wilson Award winner), 
and the Falcon Heavy was procured by SMC’s Launch 
Enterprise Directorate.  SMC's Remote Sensing experts 
provided sensor technology for the NOAA-sponsored 
COSMIC-2 mission.  Ten of the 24 satellites launched 
were from universities and one was from a high school, 
fostering education and community involvement. The 
DSX and GPIM satellites are operated out of the 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Support 
Complex (RSC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, run by 
SMC’s Development Corps Innovation and Prototyping 
Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base.  The Innovation 
and Prototyping Directorate also led guest operations 
for almost 4,000 visitors and 400 dignitaries who came 
to view the launch. 
RIDESHARE INTEGRATION 
For a complex mission such as STP-2, effective 
rideshare management is of the utmost importance. For 
STP-2, rideshare integration was generally assigned to 
the launch vehicle contractor.  However, the STP-2 
Mission Manager was also involved in this process on a 
continuous basis. STP was also responsible, in 
coordination with SMC and SpaceX, for designing the 
mission manifest, and balancing the overarching 
mission objectives with the needs of the manifested 
space vehicles and payloads. 
Selecting and Accommodating Missions 
The candidate list for STP missions is generated 
primarily from the SERB list.  The SERB looks at 
potential technologies and capabilities that need to be 
flown in space to enable future missions to employ 
these technologies.  STP offered candidates from the 
SERB list the option to fly on the STP-2 mission, if 
their needs were met by the mission’s characteristics, 
including altitude, inclination, and the capabilities of 
the launch vehicle.  After the SERB payload list was 
accommodated, additional missions were offered a ride, 
where possible, to fill the stack and dispenser ports as 
much as possible. 
Since COSMIC-2 and DSX were designated “co-
prime” missions, they (and the SpaceX and SMC 
objectives related to launch certification) drove mission 
requirements. The remaining space vehicles needed to 
be accommodated within some existing phase of the 
launch, ascent, and deployment capabilities of the 
mission.  Managing the satellite manifest, ensuring the 
suitability of the orbits, and ensuring that the launch 
vehicle could deliver all satellites to usable orbits was 
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part of the rideshare integration task. Managing the 
rideshare integration also involved determining how 
individual space vehicles could be hosted without 
interfering with adjacent space vehicles on the stack 
during ascent, and how the 24 satellites could be 
processed at the launch site without interfering with 
each other. 
To accommodate the many different missions on 
STP-2, STP-2’s rideshare management team defined a 
basic set of “services” provided for each space vehicle, 
depending on whether they were co-primes, auxiliary 
payloads (APLs), or CubeSats.  This basic set of 
services gave each space vehicle an idea of what 
services would be provided by default and helped each 
mission determine if additional services would be 
required.  Most space vehicle missions were satisfied 
with the basic services.  In some cases, the space 
vehicle mission provided additional hardware to adapt 
to the basic service supplied by the launch vehicle.  In 
these cases, the launch vehicle manager and the 
individual space vehicle managers worked together to 
determine who should supply the additional hardware 
in a manner beneficial to both parties. 
In addition to the co-prime missions and the APLs, the 
CubeSat payloads also required oversight. Like the 
APLs, each CubeSat deployment had to fit into some 
segment of the launch profile.  This was accomplished 
by designing the mission to deploy the CubeSats at the 
initial parking orbit, at the lowest altitude.  While 
CubeSat processing was somewhat simpler, since they 
were sent to the Payload Processing Facility (PPF) pre-
packaged in their deployers, the process still required 
regular coordination and communication between the 
launch vehicle manager, the CubeSat integrator, and the 
responsible STP-2 payload manager. 
Rideshare Program Office Composition 
The STP-2 program office employed space vehicle 
mission managers who worked with each space vehicle 
contractor or supplier regularly.  Some mission 
managers were responsible for multiple space vehicles, 
while a mission such as COSMIC-2, with multiple 
space vehicles on this launch, had a single program 
office mission manager.  The program office space 
vehicle mission managers and their Aerospace 
engineering support were the STP-2 Mission Manager’s 
eyes and ears for insight into all space vehicles and 
their integration with the launch vehicle.  Issues or 
concerns could be elevated to the Mission Manager for 
adjudication when necessary.  The program office also 
conducted internal meetings on a regular basis to enable 
communications up and down the management chain. 
 
Responsiveness and Adaptability 
The STP-2 team demonstrated adaptability and 
creativity when faced with re-work of the manifest 
within nine months of launch when one ESPA-class 
satellite was removed from the manifest (to launch on a 
different mission), and the eight CubeSat deployers 
were moved from the aft section of the second stage to 
two empty ESPA slots higher up on the stack (to 
mitigate excessive vibration and facilitate space vehicle 
/ launch vehicle  compatibility).  Early on in the 
mission, the team also orchestrated a critical fit-check 
exercise that required building satellite models out of 
wood, cardboard, and 3D printed elements in some 
cases. This “fit check” is described in more detail in 
later sections. 
The rideshare management team also developed and 
maintained the Interface Control Document (ICD) for 
the overall stack. The ICD functioned as an 
accommodation document, and a single place where 
rideshare management was accomplished for all space 
vehicles. 
INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENTS 
The Interface Control Document (ICD) was a 
cornerstone to the STP-2 mission, and a starting point 
for discussion of requirements on both the space vehicle 
and the launch vehicle side.  The ICD for STP-2 
contained all flight and ground requirements for the 
space vehicle missions riding on STP-2. 
Composition 
A generic ICD template was developed with 
placeholders for specific space vehicle data.  Each 
space vehicle mission then populated their section of 
the template with appropriate data. 
Some missions, such as the university satellites, easily 
fit into the generic ICD template, while others with 
more complexity added to the basic template.  For 
example, space vehicles with propulsion and specific 
propulsion requirements added this information or 
modified the basic template.  Furthermore, space 
vehicle organizations with more specific requirements, 
drawn from prior flights of their hardware, made further 
additions to the generic ICD template. 
After the initial draft of the ICD, the Launch Vehicle 
Contractor, who also functioned as the Launch System 
Integrating Contractor, conducted regularly-occurring 
telecons with each space vehicle mission.  These space 
vehicle-specific ICD telecons enabled discussion of 
interface requirements in detail as well as a better 
understanding of needs and capabilities on both the 
space vehicle and launch vehicle side.  In addition, ICD 
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discussions with the entire mission team were included 
in the agendas for face-to-face meetings, such as 
Ground Operations Working Groups (GOWGs).  Using 
these forums, all team members shared issues, 
questions, and knowledge to reduce the risk of last-
minute “gotchas” during space vehicle processing at the 
PPF. 
The STP-2 program office was intimately involved in 
all ICD discussions, and facilitated resolution of issues 
and concerns from both space vehicle and launch 
vehicle organizations.  This active engagement by the 
program office prevented issues from languishing and 
thereby kept the space vehicle/launch vehicle interfaces 
of STP-2 on track.  Ad-hoc telecons or sessions at 
GOWGs were conducted whenever needed to quickly 
address concerns and drive towards resolutions, and an 
action item list / issues log was maintained by the team. 
The frequency of individual space vehicle team ICD 
tag-ups with the launch vehicle contractor decreased, 
eventually, as the space vehicle/launch vehicle ICD 
became more defined. The ICD was revised often, with 
the final version of the ICD published within a month 
of launch.   
Moving Forward with TBDs 
In the early stages of STP-2—about mid-2013—the 
new Falcon Heavy launch vehicle was still in 
development.  As such, detailed data on expected 
launch environment was not yet available.  Coupled 
loads analysis still needed to be conducted, and each 
mission needed to know what vibration environments to 
use for design and test.  Without specific vibration 
predictions for the Falcon Heavy, the STP-2 Mission 
Manager directed each mission to use the NASA 
Goddard Standard Document GSFC-STD-7000A, 
4/22/2013 General Environmental Verification 
Standard (GEVS)1 as an interim specification, until 
Falcon Heavy’s predicted environment data was 
available, in the range of a year later.  This enabled 
each mission to keep moving along in their 
development and test effort. 
Another “TBD” involved the launch base interface for 
satellite fueling.  While the ICD template  contained the 
basic data on satellite fueling requirements at the PPF, 
it did not provide all the detailed interfaces and 
interactions required by the Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station Range Safety team.  However, early 
engagement with Range Safety in face-to-face meetings 
further defined ICD requirements and responsibilities, 
thus mitigating potential schedule risks.  This enabled 
STP-2 to clear major hurdles early, although TBDs 
related to specifics of new Green Propellant ground 
support equipment (GSE) design, test, and operator 
experience continued to evolve until much later in the 
mission cycle. 
Managing Technical Changes and New Information 
The development and integration effort for STP-2 
occurred over approximately six years, and as can be 
expected with such a complicated mission, technical 
changes occurred frequently.  Relaying these changes to 
all stakeholders required good communications 
between SpaceX, the STP-2 Program Office, and the 
space vehicle missions.  Again, regular telecons and 
face-to-face meetings were conducted to ensure that all 
team members were aware of technical changes as they 
occurred. 
One example of technical change management was 
related to the use of GEVS, mentioned above. 
Specifying GEVS as a random vibration test standard 
allowed the space vehicle missions to maintain 
schedule and move forward with testing.  However, the 
actual predicted environments for the new Falcon 
Heavy vehicle were different than those specified in 
GEVS.  This led to follow-up technical evaluations by 
experts and consultants on the launch vehicle and space 
vehicle sides to assess impacts.  In this case, multiple 
delays to STP-2 due to an unrelated Falcon-9 failure 
reduced the potential schedule pressure of space vehicle 
random vibration testing and allowed more detailed 
evaluation of the test envelopes for each space vehicle 
to satisfy launch vehicle constraints. 
Other technical changes included PPF processing and 
integration locations, GSE arrival scheduling, hardware 
storage and removal from the PPF, and allocation of 
space and facility requirements within the PPF.  
Generally, these changes were managed through regular 
Payload IPT meetings, with ad-hoc breakout sessions to 
address impacts of changes to individual missions, 
where required. 
An important part of managing technical changes was 
the use of a single mission manger on the launch 
vehicle side, with dedicated backup personnel.  On the 
space vehicle contractor side, each mission provided an 
integration manager as a single point of contact for 
channeling questions and issues to and from the space 
vehicle team.  The same rationale applied to the STP-2 
program office team, with mission-dedicated Air Force 
and Aerospace personnel for each mission.  Not only 
did this ensure continuity during the six-year duration 
of the mission, it also enabled quick responses to 
technical changes as they arose. 
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GOVERNMENT / COMMERCIAL WORKING 
RELATIONSHIPS AND PRACTICES 
Cooperation 
Accomplishing STP-2 required 15 separate program 
offices and all their individual mission partners and 
contractors to coalesce into one engineering team to 
create an integrated payload stack where each of the 
rideshare partners had to be accountable and 
responsible for the success of the others as well as the 
overall mission.  Given the nature of the partnership, 
and the fact that few team members were bound to each 
other by contractual agreements, collaboration and 
voluntary support across the team were an essential 
requirement for success.  
This common understanding set the stage for what a 
Forbes article labelled a “mighty good test of 
governmental cooperation.”2 Not only was the mission 
a good test of cooperation between the DoD, NOAA 
and NASA, but it was also a good test at the 
commercial and university levels,  as well. Forging and 
managing this cooperation provided a lot of the lessons 
learned for STP-2, and the recommendations discussed 
next.  
Agreements, Understanding, and Flexibility 
In the absence of formal contracts between the 
participants, roles and responsibilities for the team 
members were established by agreements documented 
in numerous memoranda of understanding. The STP-2 
team found it important to start the document off with 
what the agreement would accomplish, and why the 
agreement was mutually beneficial to each party. If 
those two facts remained constant over the course of 
executing the mission, the remaining statements in the 
memorandum could be modified and adjusted as 
needed.  
The need for patience and flexibility cannot be 
overstated. Many R&D satellite developers have small 
teams, small businesses providing support, and little 
ability to acquire the specialized engineering services 
that large developers use. Many of the missions on 
STP-2 involved university teams that employed 
undergraduate-level labor, with graduate students acting 
as design and engineering leads, and a single professor 
providing management and continuity. Not all STP-2 
team members had access to the same analysis, 
modeling, or testing tools, which made establishing 
standards across the teams a challenge. All this required 
flexibility and support from the integrator and the 
rideshare management team. In large, multi-agency 
rideshare missions, teams should ideally find a way to 
simplify and focus the required data information 
exchange to eliminate non-essential information and 
reduce the need for overly complex models. This is 
especially important in the effort required to complete 
analysis of the integrated payload stack. 
To ensure space vehicle testing was adequate without 
placing unnecessary risk on the payloads, a significant 
amount of highly technical structural engineering and 
testing expertise was required. Few small satellite teams 
have this level of expertise, so the STP-2 program 
office augmented several of the teams with consultants 
and provided modelling and testing support as required.  
Schedule Slips  
STP-2 encountered several schedule slips as the Falcon 
Heavy development schedule unfolded and SpaceX 
dealt with two Falcon-9 issues. Most of the spacecraft 
teams found the additional schedule margin useful 
either in navigating technical challenges or resolving 
newly discovered performance issues from similar 
components on orbit. But the launch slips caused 
challenges, too. Missions had to track and monitor 
limited shelf-life items, as well as coordinate the right 
time to install flight batteries, tension any release 
mechanisms, and start operational readiness 
preparation. It’s best to realize up front that a new 
launch vehicle’s schedule, while helpful in organizing 
the sequence of work, isn’t always a good indication of 
the duration of that work, since the work has never been 
done before. 
A launch slip also affects cost and occasionally 
personnel depending on the duration and/or timing of 
the slip. The government, commercial and university 
teams STP-2 handled cost and personnel impacts 
differently. Universities are essentially graduating the 
workforce, so any slip is likely to a have an impact on 
personnel. Continuity within the university staff, 
coupled with a thorough handover to new staff and 
close supervision of new students touching flight 
hardware is key for success on any university program. 
Cost is typically only an issue if components require 
replacement; however, university programs are usually 
willing to accept a significant level of risk if the 
funding isn’t available.    
Government team members can typically absorb a 
launch slip with some re-planning or realigning of 
personnel to other projects. Personnel cost is less of an 
issue for government employees, but government 
contracts with mission assurance providers, consultants 
and other support contractors can get costly, require 
modification, and in some cases even undergo re-
competition if the slip exceeds or occurs near the end of 
a period of performance. Once the program is on track 
it can be easier to bring government teams back on the 
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project. Fiscal year budgets adjustments also create 
opportunities to absorb the cost growth.  
Commercial businesses focus mostly on cost reduction 
and are motivated to minimize non-productive effort. 
Small businesses often don’t have the ability to float 
employees across multiple programs like government 
and large businesses do. A finite cash flow makes it 
imperative to minimize labor costs and non-essential 
business expenses. A lengthy launch delay for a small 
commercial satellite provider may result in an 
untenable situation - an inability to generate revenue or 
recruit additional investors which could lead to 
bankruptcy or a sell-off of the company’s assets. 
Practice Differences 
Other practice differences reflect the nature of the 
organizations involved. Government teams prefer 
methodical, detailed, specification-compliant processes 
defined by contractual requirements with the 
expectation that all engineering effort is subjected to a 
review by a large committee of peers. Engineering 
changes are expected to undergo thorough review, 
potentially even at the system level, to ensure second 
and third order effects are considered across the system. 
Configuration changes are closely managed and 
overseen by government and mission assurance 
engineers.  
In contrast, commercial and educational mission 
managers tend to allow engineering teams to manage 
their efforts internally. The engineering teams have the 
authority and oversight of change requests and the 
customer typically has one or two engineers embedded 
in the team who are empowered to review and accept 
the design and any changes. Design reviews are often 
less formal events, and more focused engineering 
analysis reviews are by a smaller group of internal 
peers.  
The payload teams on STP-2 managed events 
differently depending on whether they were a 
government-contracted spacecraft, a commercial 
spacecraft or a university spacecraft. What was most 
important at the integrated payload stack level was 
communication across the teams between the right 
engineering disciplines. Multi-manifest missions 
require well-understood interfaces and data is difficult 
to understand without open channels of discussion 
between responsible engineers on both sides of the 
interface. Documentation alone should not be expected 
to fully communicate the subtle complexities that need 
to be understood. 
 
Knowledge Transfer 
With limited documentation particularly early in the 
mission, some verbal agreements and information 
exchanged during early working group and technical 
interchange meetings were lost when individuals moved 
on.  The team then had to put items that were 
previously closed back on the table for technical 
discussion and resolution with the new crew.  On the 
lean, quick missions performed by STP, where 
meetings between engineers can take the place of more 
formal documentation, it is important to keep rigorous 
meeting minutes reviewed by the team and to get the 
few formal documents (such as the ICD) started as soon 
as possible.  A byproduct of not having recorded 
meeting minutes were the issues that lingered without 
resolution week after week.  Some integration issues 
were discussed for a year or more without resolution or 
assignment as action items to a lead point of contact.   
The loss of legacy knowledge was most keenly felt at 
the range for launch integration.  Several of the people 
performing the integration work did not have the full-
mission familiarity with the stack or even their own 
mission segment.  It is most striking to compare the 
attendance list at the STP-2 fit check with the 
participants at the launch integration.  The 
overwhelming majority of the original crew had left the 
program by launch.  Documentation of the fit check 
was further limited by the fact that SpaceX uses 
electronic procedures that are difficult to print out and 
annotate.  The as-run record remained electronic and in 
SpaceX’s possession, not distributed to the team. 
One of the best methods to ensure continuity despite 
personnel change was the shared document site that 
held the critical documents for the team.  This website, 
maintained by STP and accessible to all, was a safe 
repository of the latest mission data.  The other best 
method of maintaining team integrity and transferring 
information was the effort made by each transitioning 
person to individually turn over their position, data, and 
knowledge.  The fact that many of these professionals 
took that effort seriously, and of course that everyone 
didn’t transition at the same time, kept some of the 
legacy knowledge alive.  
Maintaining Communication Across the Disciplines 
Teams need to have the ability to contact and discuss 
the interface details between the responsible engineers 
during the design process. The names and contact 
information of responsible engineers need to be shared 
across each of the interfaces so when questions are 
thought of they can be asked by the right person and 
answered by the right person - ideally before the answer 
Voelkel 9 34th Annual 
  Small Satellite Conference 
is needed, and not once the interface has been fully 
designed and adjustments are difficult.  
Hierarchies within teams tend to squelch such direct 
communication for several reasons that are valid 
concerns but can be handled appropriately once 
understood and brought to light. Sending questions up 
the chain and then down the chain and answers back in 
the same way often leads to confusion and extraneous 
discussion involving tangential issues. Managers or 
system engineers with good intentions can sometimes 
insert their answer and not allow the question to get to 
the right person.  
Often management’s biggest valid concern is that a 
lower level engineer will agree to an interface 
requirement that results in a design change causing cost 
growth or other system-level impacts outside the scope 
of that engineer. The solution in this case is to make it 
known that any discussion that results in cost growth or 
system level impacts are only approved at the 
management/system level. Another valid concern is that 
these discussions between the responsible engineers 
could distract them from the priorities set by 
management. The schedule can help resolve these 
concerns provided it’s shared across the team and 
understood that if some activities are behind or in 
critical periods, the answer may not necessarily be 
available, or appropriate to ask at the time. Keep team 
members aware of the full schedule and status to help 
them understand when the best opportunity might be to 
communicate. 
NAVIGATING POLICY / SAFETY 
COMPLIANCE 
Another challenge for STP-2 was policy compliance. 
With 24 satellites from 13 organizations flying on a 
rocket procured by the Air Force, it took a lot of effort 
to determine the compliance authorities and approvals 
required to launch. Many of the ridesharing partners 
were also universities new to launch, who required 
guidance through the process. 
First, the STP-2 IPS team needed to determine the roles 
and responsibilities of all the mission players. As the 
launching agency, would the Air Force be required to 
obtain all licenses and perform all compliance 
certifications of the missions on STP-2? It seemed clear 
that this was not a tenable option. The mission included 
satellites from agencies as diverse as the Air Force, 
NASA, commercial entities, and the government of 
Taiwan. Not all Air Force policies were applicable to 
all payloads riding on STP-2, and it was inappropriate 
for the Air Force to request frequency licenses for 
commercial or private missions. Yet, the STP-2 Air 
Force team wanted to be certain that it was not 
launching satellites that would violate national or 
international guidelines on spectrum usage, debris, 
imaging, and so forth. 
Figure 4: Certification responsibilities for the STP-2 Integrated Payload Stack 
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What emerged from these early discussions was a 
process by which the Air Force team divided the 
mission into areas of responsibility, as shown in Figure 
4 for some of the satellites. Each satellite on the 
mission was responsible for its own licensing and 
certification process, to include its own mission 
assurance. So, the NASA satellites on the mission went 
through NASA channels for debris compliance, 
frequency allocation, and other certifications as needed; 
similarly, the Air Force satellites went through Air 
Force channels, and the private / commercial satellites 
went through commercial licensing processes. The 
foreign satellites followed law and policy applicable to 
their satellites. Each mission, however, was required to 
provide a certification letter (like the one shown in 
Figure 5) to the Air Force and the STP-2 IPS mission 
manager, signed by a representative of their 
organization, to certify that all applicable policies were 
followed, all necessary licenses were obtained, and that 
the satellite was ready for launch and would “do no 
harm” to the rest of the mission or the launch vehicle. 
For sponsored satellites (such as the university satellites 
overseen by AFRL as part of the University 
Nanosatellite Program), the sponsoring agency co-
signed the certification letter; for the international 
partners on the mission (specifically the Taiwanese 
Space Agency for the COSMIC-2 satellites), the US 
partner on the mission (the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration) co-signed the letter.  
The STP-2 team then performed a “do no harm” risk 
assessment as described later in this paper, not only on 
aspects related to launch failure such as structural 
soundness and testing, but also on policy compliance 
and “do no harm” to the space environment. The results 
of this assessment, along with the certification letters 
for each organization were presented to the Air Force 
launch approval authority for his consideration and 
final launch approval. This “trust but verify” approach 
was sufficient to satisfy US Air Force requirements for 
launch and space safety.  
While the final responsibility for licensing and policy 
compliance rested with the individual satellite 
organizations, the STP-2 team provided guidance and 
advice to many of the organizations involved. To be 
effective in this task, the team spent many hours 
researching policy not only for the Air Force satellites 
on the mission, but also for the university and NASA 
satellites. In several cases, the team requested 
clarification of unclear or undetermined policy points 
from the policy owners. The team ultimately wrote a 
“roadmap” for policy compliance, which is now 
available online for use by the wider community.3,4 
DO NO HARM AND FIT CHECKS 
STP-2 is the first large-scale application of Do No 
Harm / Rideshare Mission Assurance, which The 
Aerospace Corporation at STP pioneered and is 
refining.5,6 Each space vehicle mission was responsible 
for their own mission assurance. STP-2 merely 
provided the ride to orbit. However, the STP-2 program 
office took on the responsibility to assess do-no-harm 
risks for the entire stack of space vehicle payloads. This 
allowed the mission to proceed and succeed despite 
different risk tolerances among the 24 satellites (from 
the large ESPA-based DSX spacecraft to the university 
and high school CubeSats) and at the pace of 
commercial speed.  
Aerospace conducted detailed and thorough analysis of 
more than 800 do-no-harm items.  A set of heritage do-
no-harm requirements was developed from prior STP 
missions.  This list was reviewed and updated regularly 
by the STP-2 program office, and verification artifacts 
or data were requested from each space vehicle mission 
to ensure that do-no-harm requirements were met by all 
space vehicles. Examples of do-no-harm criteria 
include space vehicle compliance with:  launch 
environment (random vibration, acoustics, shock, static 
loads, penalty testing), contamination, electromagnetic 
interference, pressure vessel requirements, electrical 
inhibits, deployment, and end of life safing. A do-no-
harm matrix/checklist captured all space vehicle 
mission partners’ compliance with the do-no-harm 
Figure 5: Sample certification letter for STP-2 
payloads 
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requirements.  The do-no-harm document was used as 
an artifact of compliance for STP-2 readiness reviews. 
A particularly critical risk-reduction activity related to 
the do-no-harm process was the space vehicle stack-
level fit check.  The fit check was performed in the 
actual PPF bay used for space vehicle/launch vehicle 
processing at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.  Each 
space vehicle team was required to participate with 
space vehicle models that were volume and mass 
representatives of the actual flight vehicles.  In the case 
of COSMIC-2, with six space vehicles on the flight, 
only two were mass- and volumetrically-accurate 
models, while the other four were volumetrically-
accurate models constructed from lightweight materials.  
A requirement of the “mass models” (the title mostly 
used for the fit check articles) was for accurate 
portrayal of appendages from each model, including 
antennas or sensors that protruded from the space 
vehicle bus.  This accurate portrayal for the space 
vehicles, especially on the APL ring, was invaluable for 
practicing processing, lift, and installation on the 
dispenser ring, and exercising access constraints for 
adjacent space vehicles. 
The STP-2 program facilitated development of mass 
models, especially for university satellites, where a 
non-flight model did not exist, or would have been 
difficult to develop under the university or lab resource 
constraints.  For the APL ring, a series of representative 
mass models were developed that could simulate 
multiple space vehicles through addition of small 
balance weights, and appropriate simulated appendages.  
In addition, these mass models could be flown on the 
launch vehicle if a space vehicle were de-manifested 
late in the mission cycle, to avoid new launch vehicle 
loads and control analyses.  In other cases, space 
vehicle contractors also possessed non-flight space 
vehicles that were used for the fit check, and could be 
flown as mass models, if the need arose. 
The fit check proved to be a success, resulting in a 
number of lessons learned, and the ability to mitigate 
problems or issues that might have become technical or 
schedule risks to the mission during actual space 
vehicle/launch vehicle processing.  Over one hundred 
lessons learned were consolidated from individual 
space vehicle missions, the launch vehicle contractor, 
and the STP-2 program office.  These lessons learned 
were reviewed by the entire team, and follow-up 
actions delegated for their implementation. 
One example of the value of the fit check is the 
discovery of access problems for installation of 
omnidirectional antennas in a space vehicle area near 
the dispenser’s mounting flange.  The space vehicle 
contractor subsequently added an additional spacer ring 
to increase clearance for installing the antennas, and for 
installing and torqueing bolts for the space vehicle to 
dispenser flange mounting. 
The fit check also enabled the actual team members 
from both the space vehicle and launch vehicle side to 
experience working together in a representative 
workspace, thus facilitating the surfacing of questions 
and issues through use of real hardware.  It also 
required development of a processing schedule by the 
launch vehicle contractor, with estimates of the duration 
of each step in space vehicle processing. This took 
significant planning, as it included managing the date-
staggered delivery of each space vehicle and its GSE, 
the space vehicle movement into the PPF highbay, the 
highbay work area setup for each space vehicle 
mission, the scheduling of the overhead crane, and the 
storage of GSE and related hardware before and after 
its use for processing.  This led to discoveries such a 
need for additional pallet jacks, the need for more 
storage space for space vehicle hardware, and a revision 
in the space vehicle mounting sequence for the 
COSMIC-2 upper dispenser rings. 
Initially, space vehicle processing was planned for the 
West Bay of the SpaceX PPF.  However, in the 
timeframe of the Fit Check, the West Bay was 
processing flight hardware for an ISS resupply mission.  
Therefore, the Fit Check occurred in the PPF East Bay, 
which is not identical in layout to the planned 
processing area.  Ultimately, the actual space 
vehicle/launch vehicle processing occurred in the same 
bay (East Bay) as the fit check.  This was fortuitous, 
since the space vehicle teams were familiar with this 
workspace. 
In summary, the importance of the fit check cannot be 
overstated, especially for rideshare missions.  In the 
case of STP-2, the actual space vehicle/launch vehicle 
processing at the PPF would likely have incurred 
numerous technical issues, and the launch schedule 
could have been impacted had a Fit Check been 
omitted.   
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LAUNCH 
SpaceX performed the IPS integration in the LC-39A 
Hangar, mounting six COSMIC-2 spacecraft, five 
ESPA-class auxiliary payloads, and eight Poly Picosat 
Orbital Deployers (i.e., 24U of CubeSats) on three 
SpaceX dispenser rings. The DSX spacecraft topped the 
stack creating an IPS totaling approximately 6000 kg. 
After launch and second engine cutoff, the Oculus 
spacecraft and CubeSats were separated at 
approximately 28.5° inclination in a 300 x 860 km 
orbit.  Then, after another second stage burn, the 
remaining four auxiliary spacecraft and the six 
COSMIC-2 spacecraft were separated at approximately 
24° inclination in a 720 x 720 km orbit. After the third 
and fourth second engine burns, the DSX spacecraft 
was separated at approximately 42° inclination in a 
6,000 x 12,000 km orbit.  Finally, SpaceX performed a 
fifth second stage burn with the Falcon Heavy. The 
STP-2 mission flawlessly executed a six-hour 
deployment sequence, successfully placing 24 satellites 
in three unique orbits. All satellites were ultimately 
contacted by their respective agencies for mission 
operations. 
CONCLUSION 
STP-2 achieved many firsts: in addition to being the 
first DoD and Air Force use of the Falcon Heavy launch 
vehicle, it represented the first DoD reuse of Falcon 
boosters.  It was also the first wide-scale application of 
STP “do no harm” processes, the first DoD test case for 
rideshare certification policy, and – with 13 
organizations from military, civil, university, 
commercial, and foreign organizations involved – the 
most complex launch mission ever attempted by the Air 
Force.  
STP-2 was a multi-nation, multi-agency, multi-
organization rideshare effort that served as a pathfinder 
for how government, industry, academia, and 
international partners can work together on multi-
manifest missions. It is the team’s hope that by 
applying some of the lessons learned reflected in this 
document – by establishing good communications and 
mutual understanding up front, by implementing strong 
rideshare management techniques and interface control, 
by understanding policy compliance and do-no-harm 
considerations, and by facilitating knowledge transfer 
within and among payload teams – other missions can 
achieve the success STP experienced on its first Falcon 
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Figure 6: STP-2 launch (photo courtesy of 
NASA) 
 
